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Abstract. In this paper, we consider a routing game in a network that
contains lossy links. We consider a multi-objective problem where the
players have each a weighted sum of a delay cost and a cost for losses.
We compute the equilibrium and optimal solution (which are unique). We
discover here in addition to the classical Kameda type paradox another
paradoxical behavior in which higher loss rates have a positive impact on
delay and therefore higher quality links may cause a worse performance
even in the case of a single player.
Keywords: Routing game, multi-objective problem, lossy links, Nash
equilibrium, price of anarchy, paradox.
1 Introduction
There has been much work on routing games with additive costs (cost associated
with a route is additive over the links of the route) [6,7]. This has been extended
to multi-objective additive criteria, see e.g., [4,8,6]. Little is known however on
routing games with non additive costs. There has been some work on routing
games for some given simple topologies with non-additive costs [6] triggered by
networking applications (e.g., [5,3]).
In this work, we consider costs related to weighted sum of two different types
of performances: the delay which is additive, and losses which are not. We focus
on a simple network model that has been studied in the case of a single objective
by [2,3]. We first derive explicit expression of the equilibrium and then study
numerically its properties.
In case of a single objective, it has been shown that a Braess type paradox
exists for the topology that we consider [2,3]. We identify a new type of paradox
which has some surprising behavior. We then compute the price of anarchy
(defined as in [1]).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe the
system model and the performance measures adopted throughout the paper. In
Section 3, we compute the global optimum. The Nash equilibrium is computed in
Section 4. Simulation results along with the discussion are presented in Section
6. Performance results including the price of anarchy and paradoxes are provided
in 5. Section 7 concludes the paper.
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Fig. 1. The competitive routing model.
2 The model and performance measures
We shall use the load balancing network topology introduced in [2] consisting of
three nodes: two source nodes Sr and Sl (r stands for right and l for left) and
one common destination node D (see Figure 1). There are 2N sources of flows,
S(i), i = 1, . . . , 2N . Each flow consists of an independent Poisson distributed
point process with a rate φ. Packets from source i = 1, . . . , N arrive packets
from source i = N+1, . . . , 2N arrive at node Sr (right). Source i = 1, . . . , N can
split its flow between its direct path SlD and the indirect one SlSrD. Source
i = N +1, . . . , 2N can split its flow between its direct path SrD and the indirect
one SrSlD.
More precisely, whenever a packet arrives from source i, the source flips a coin
that has a probability pi to have an outcome called ”direct” and a probability of
1− pi to have an outcome called ”indirect”. If the outcome is ”direct” then the
packet is routed over the direct route, and otherwise it is routed over the indirect
one. The process of packets originating from source i that take the direct path
is thus Poisson with rate φpi. The process of packets that arrive at node i and
that take the indirect path is Poisson with rate φ(1 − pi). Let xil be the rate
of flow sent by source i through link l. Links SrSl and SlSr are assumed to be
wireless so that packets sent over SrSl and SlSr suffer independent losses with
some fix probability q. The delay over these links is assumed to be a constant
denoted by δ. Links SlD and SrD are assumed to be lossless but they incur a
congestion cost per flow unit that uses them of Tl(x) = 1/(C − xl). Here, C is
the link capacity and xl is the total flow going through link l. Therefore for each
player i, consider the arrival process of packets that arrive at node Sk and that
are rerouted to the indirect path SkSmD (where k = l, r, m 6= k). It is a Poisson
process as well and its rate is φp(1− pi)(1− q).
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Let i ≤ N . The cost for source i is a weighted sum of the average delay of
its flow and its loss rate:
Ji(p) =
φpi
C − φ
∑N
j=1 pj − φq
∑2N
i=N+1(1− pj)
+
φ(1− q)(1− pi)
C − φ
∑2N
j=N+1 pj − φq
∑N
i=1(1− pj)
+
φδ(1− q)(1− pi) + γφq(1− pi).
(1)
The three first terms correspond to the delay cost and the last term corre-
sponds to the cost of losses. The first term corresponds to the congestion cost
in the direct path of i and the two following terms correspond to the conges-
tion cost along the indirect path. The optimal symmetric solution is obtained
by minimizing
∑
i Ji(p) over pi and adding the constraint that pi are the same
for all i (we then omit i from the notation pi).
Let
Xl(x) = φ
N∑
j=1
pj + φq
2N∑
j=N+1
(1− pj)
be the rate of packets that use link SlD. We assume that the link cost per unit
of flow are linear in the flow through them. This amounts to use the first term
in the Taylor’s expansion of (1). Ji(p) is thus approximated by
Ji(p) =
φpi(axl + b) + φ(1− q)(1− pi)(axl + b) + δφ(1− pi) + γφq(1− pi)
where a and b are some positive constants.
3 Global optimum calculation
The global optimal solution is obtained by solving
∂
∂p
2N∑
i=1
Ji(p) = 0
(unless it is on the boundary). We obtain the unique solution:
p =
1
2
aφN(2q2 − 2q + 1) + bq − γq − δ
φaqN(q − 1)
.
We find it convenient in the numerical investigation to write z = γq + δ since
the dependence of the global optimum or the equilibrium on each one of the two
parameters δ and γ (for fixed q) appears only through the value of z. Thus, p
can be written:
4
p =
1
2
aφN(2q2 − 2q + 1) + bq − z
φaqN(q − 1)
.
Note that
J ′(p) = 2aφ2q2N(1− p) + φbq + φ2aN + 2aφ2qN(p− 1)− φz.
J ′(p) = 0 for
z = −2aφqN(((1− p)(1− q)) + bq + aφN
J ′(p) is positive if z < φaN(2q(q − 1)(1 − p) + 1) + qb. In this case J is an
increasing function , and the minimum is reached on 0.
On the other hand, if z > φaN(2q(q − 1)(1− p) + 1) + qb, J is a decreasing
function, and the minimum is reached on 1.
Note that
– p < 1 if z < aφN + qb
– p > 0 if z > aφN(2q2 − 2q + 1) + qb.
4 Equilibrium calculation
The equilibrium is obtained by setting pi = p to be the same for all i except
for i = 1 where it is taken to be equal to p̂. We then find for each value p the
best response p̂ = f(p) for player 1. A fixed point of this equation provides the
equilibrium. We did the same as below and get the Nash equilibrium which is
equal to:
p1 =
1
2
−aφqN(p+ q − pq) + q(φap+ φa− b+ γ)− φa+ δ
φaq
.
Let p̂ be the point obtained by replacing p1 by p , we obtain:
p̂ =
aφNq2 + aφ(1− q) + qb− γq − δ
aφq(qN −N − 1)
.
p̂ =
aφNq2 + aφ(1− q) + qb− z
aφq(qN −N − 1)
.
We have qN < N < N + 1, so the denominator is negative.
By differentiating the cost function with respect to p̂ and setting the deriva-
tive equal to zero, we get for equilibrium these conditions:
– J is an increasing function if: z > 2aφqN − aφN + bq,
– J is a decreasing function if: z < 2aφqN − aφN + bq.
Also note that
– p̂ < 1 if z < aφ(qN + 1) + bq
– p̂ > 0 if z > aφq2N + aφ(1− q) + bq
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5 Price of anarchy and paradoxes
The price of anarchy is the ratio of the worst case objective function value of
a Nash equilibrium and that of an optimal outcome. That measures how the
efficiency of a system degrades due to selfish behavior of its agents. The price of
anarchy [1] is a method to measure the inefficiency of equilibrium, it has been
used to measure the inefficiency in congestion networks. In this case, each user
of the network has a source and destination and they must pay a cost to travel
from their source to their destination. In this case it is given by:
PoA =
2NJi(p̂)
2NJi(p)
We say that a paradox occurs if when replacing links with higher quality ones
result in worse performance. In our case, a higher quality link could mean a link
with smaller delay δ or one with a smaller loss probability q. For example, there
is a paradox if the derivative J ′(δ) of J at the equilibrium w.r.t. the delay δ is
negative, where
J ′(δ) =
aφ+ aφN2(1 + q2) + 2aφNq(1−N) + 2bq − 2δ − 2γq
aq(qN −N − 1)2
In a similar network with a single objective for each player, a paradoxes
been observed [5,3,2] in which, for suitable parameters, improving the quality
of the link(s) between Sr and Sl results in worse performance for all players.
We may search for a similar paradox in our problem in which the quality of the
link stands for its delay (higher quality means lower delay) or loss rate (higher
quality means lower loss rate). The condition for this type of paradox is then
that J at equilibrium would be decreasing in the network parameter (e.g., in the
delay δ). Thus, the derivative of J ′ at equilibrium should be decreasing where
the latter is given by
J ′(δ) =
aφ+ aφN2(1 + q2) + 2aφNq(1−N) + 2bq − 2z
aq(qN −N − 1)2
Note that J is a decreasing function if
z >
1
2
φa(1 +N2)− 1
2
φaqN(2N − qN − 2) + bq
6 Numerical results
Let us now validate our theoretical findings through numerical simulations. We
consider a = 1, b = 1, N = 4, φ = 1, q = 0.5. Notice that the domain of existence
of z in this case is [2.2, 3]
Fig. 2 depicts the equilibrium p̂ and the optimal solution p as function of z. As
expected, we observe that both p̂ and p are increasing in z, while the equilibrium
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Fig. 2. The optimal solution and the equilibrium as a function of z.
p̂ dominates the optimal solution p. Fig. 3 depicts the cost function of the optimal
solution J(p) and the equilibrium J(p̂) as a function of z. We observe that both
curves are increasing functions. In Fig. 4, we present respectively the variation
of the cost function at the optimal solution and at the equilibrium as a function
of the loss probability q. Fig. 5 depicts the variation of the cost function at the
equilibrium as a function of the link delay δ. The price of anarchy is presented
in Fig. 6. As expected, for low values of z, the price of anarchy tends to 1.
Discussion
New paradox: We identify in Figure 4 a new type of paradox: the cost is
seen not to be monotone in the quality of the link (the loss probability q). This
phenomenon is due to the particular multi-objective structure of our problem.
Indeed, higher q increases the cost related to losses, but contributes to decreasing
the global cost as more losses results in lower congestion and thus in lower delays.
Kameda-paradox: We obtain in Figure 5 the paradox already observed in
[5,3,2] in which larger link delay are beneficial for all users. Investing in faster
links increases the delay and deteriorates the performance for all players.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the routing game with lossy links and congestion.
The cost included both a delay component as well as one corresponding to the
losses. After computing the unique optimal solution and the symmetric equilib-
rium, we have showed that even in the case of global optimization there may
be a paradox due to the fact that increasing the loss rate may be advantageous
when delays are high. In addition the Kameda-paradox has been also shown to
occur here.
7
Fig. 3. The cost function at the optimal solution and the equilibrium as a function of
z.
Fig. 4. The cost function J as a function of the loss probability q.
References
1. E. Koutsoupias and C. Papadimitriou. Worst-case equilibria. In Proc. STACS, 1999.
2. H. Kameda, E. Altman, T. Kozawa, and Y. Hosokawa, Braess-like paradoxes in
distributed computer systems. IEEE Trans. on Automatic Control 45 (9) 1687 -
1690 (2000).
3. E. Altman, J. Kuri, R. El-Azouzi. A routing game in networks with lossy links.7th
International Conference on NETwork Games Control and OPtimization (NETG-
COOP 2014), Oct 2014, Trento, Italy. 2014.
4. Yunan Wu, Yuchen Peng, Long Peng, Ling Xu ”Super Efficiency of Multicriterion
Network Equilibrium Model and Vector Variational Inequality”, Journal of Opti-
mization Theory and Applications, Volume 153, Issue 2, pp 485-496, May 2012.
5. E. Altman, R. El-Azouzi and V. Abramov , ”Non-Cooperative Routing in Loss
Networks” , Performance Evaluation, Vol 49, Issue 1-4, pp. 43-55, 2002.
8
Fig. 5. J(p̂) as a function of the link delay δ.
Fig. 6. The price of anarchy.
6. Altman, T. Boulogne, R. El Azouzi, T. Jimenez and L. Wynter, ”A survey on
networking games in telecommunications”; Computers and Operations Research,
33, pp 286-311, 2006.
7. L. Wynter and E. Altman, ”Equilibrium, games, and pricing in transportation and
telecommunications networks”, Networks and Spacial Economics, special issue of
on ”Crossovers between Transportation Planning and Telecommunications”, Vol. 4,
Issue 1, p. 7–21, March 2004.
8. El-Azouzi R, Altman E. ”Constrained traffic equilibrium in routing”, IEEE Trans-
actions on Automatic Control 2003;48(9):1656-1660.
